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AN ANALYSIS ON THE DIVERGENCE IN CROSS-COUNTRY WORLD
LEADER RATINGS

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This paper attempts to explain why foreigners rate world leaders differently than domestic citizens by examining 2008 World Public Opinion data on world leader ratings. I find that as a country's net exports, ethnic diversity, and focus on the future increase, that country tends to rate foreign leaders higher than the domestic citizens do. I also find that countries more accepting of autocratic governments and inequality tend to rate foreign leaders lower than the domestic citizens do. In addition, this study finds that countries with more press freedom rate not only foreign leaders lower than domestic citizens do, but also rate their own leaders lower as well. This paper differs from prior research by examining international trust and opinion on specific world leaders instead of on specific events and policies.

Key words: international public opinion, presidential ratings, world leader ratings, press freedom, media freedom

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I. Introduction

World Public Opinion is an international collaborative project whose aim is to give voice to public opinion around the world on international issues. In 2008, World Public Opinion conducted a poll of 19,751 respondents in 20 nations around the world that comprise 60 percent of the world's population. The poll was used to help determine how the nations around the world felt not only about their own leader, but also the leaders in other countries around the world. The respondents were asked to rate how much confidence they had in each of the leaders to do the right thing. The percentage of people who are confident in each leader to do the right thing will be referred to simply as the rating throughout the paper. Therefore, the more confident people are in a leader to do the right thing, the higher the rating that leader will receive.

Why do foreigners rate world leaders differently than domestic citizens do? Do macroeconomic variables such as annual GDP growth, net exports, and inflation influence the ratings each leader receives or are they influenced by specific cultural variables? Are the ratings influenced by whether the countries trade with one another or have had previous conflicts in the past? Or are the ratings impacted by media that controls and influences the way people view other countries and their leaders? Examining data on the 20 countries in the World Public Opinion survey, this paper will attempt to explain why there is a difference between foreign and domestic ratings of the same leader.

There has been a long-standing debate over whether public opinion about world affairs is better described as rational or irrational. Almond (1950) was one of the first to argue that mass opinion about world affairs is ignorant, irrational, and lacks any foundation in abstract reasoning. This was the conventional wisdom until Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) and Shapiro and Page (1988) argued that although people cannot capture and process all of the information regarding

international affairs, they can use information shortcuts to form political judgments. These scholars found that by doing so, people could still form sensible and rational views about world affairs despite lacking any extensive knowledge on the matter.

Since then, much research has been done that has tried to answer not only whether or not public opinion about world affairs is rational but also what shapes these opinions. Previous research has only focused on mass public opinion about world affairs using primarily survey data. This paper differs from existing research by examining mass public opinion about specific leaders from around the world by examining economic, political freedom, and cultural variables. Specifically, this study tries to explain why there is a difference between domestic and foreign ratings of the same national leader. I find that as a country's net exports, ethnic diversity, and focus on the future increase, that country tends to rate foreign leaders higher than the domestic citizens do. Additionally, I find that countries with more press freedom rate foreign leaders lower than domestic citizens do and also rate their own leaders lower than foreigners do. Lastly, I find that countries that are more accepting of oppressive governments and inequality are more likely to rate foreign leaders lower than the domestic citizens will.

II. Literature Review

A. Political Trust

There is still debate among scholars on whether or not the general public is rational or irrational when it comes to holding opinions on international affairs. Almond (1950) stated that mass opinion about world affairs is ignorant, irrational, and lacks any foundation in abstract reasoning. Shapiro and Page (1988) tested this claim by looking at how much change and stability is found in American's opinions about foreign policy and national defense. Using

survey data over the period 1935-1982, Shapiro and Page find that foreign policy opinion changed about three times as rapidly as domestic opinions but found it to be reasonable because circumstances tend to change more frequently in international affairs than in domestic ones. The authors also refuted Almond's idea that mass opinion is irrational when it comes to international affairs by finding that the American public has generally responded in a sensible fashion to international events as reported and interpreted by U.S. mass media and American leaders. Shapiro and Page find that when the general public is given information that is unbiased and leaders explain international realities clearly and correctly, the general public responds by making sensible opinions that are worth taking into account when designing policies.

Citrin and Green (1986) analyzed the impact of political trust on how the government functions and found that the level of political trust among citizens is more a function of what the government does than a constraint on what it can do. They find strong connections between the incumbent president's job performance and more generalized feelings of confidence in the government. They find that if an incumbent president has a desirable quality, trust in the government increases. By the same token, if there are declining economic outcomes and the incumbent president is performing poor, trust in the government decreases and improves the chances for reforms advocated by opposing parties and candidates.

Hetherington (1998) added to research on political trust by finding that higher levels of trust are of great benefit to both elected officials and political institutions. Hetherington (1999) again contributed to research on the effect of political trust by examining its impact on the presidential vote during from 1968-1996 and finds that that high trust is associated with voting for the incumbent. When trust is low, Hetherington finds that people do not vote as much for either of the main two candidates but instead vote for the third party. He suggests that this

occurs because distrusting people favor candidates who challenge existing political norms, which is usually the case with third party candidates. When there is no third party running, however, Hetherington finds that people are more inclined to vote for the challenger over the incumbent whenever political trust is low.

Chanley (1999) contributed to the understanding of the nature of public opinion on foreign policy by examining aggregate changes in U.S. public support for international involvement, also known as internationalism, during the period 1964-1993. Chanley finds that the public responds in a rational way by changing their support internationalism based on whatever the media presents as the most important problem facing the nation. When international issues are presented to be the most important problem facing the nation, support for internationalism increases. Whenever the media presents domestic concerns as the biggest problem facing the country, however, support for internationalism decrease. Chanley finds that as public concern about important issues of the day changes, so does public support for activity in international affairs.

Brewer, et al. (2004) contributed to the research on political trust by developing a theoretical framework for the term international trust. The authors defined international trust as the level of trust Americans have about other nations. They find that survey respondents who generally trusted other nations were more likely than those who did not to perceive a wide range of specific nations as friendly and unthreatening, as well as more likely to favor internationalism, becoming involved in foreign affairs, as a general principle. Additionally, the authors find that people with low levels of international trust are more likely to see other nations as unfriendly and threatening and more likely to favor military action.

B. Television and Media

There has been much research that shows that the television and media largely influence the public on its views of domestic and international affairs. Jordan and Page (1992) analyzed data involving repeated measures of public opinion and content analyses of television news broadcasts to estimate the impact of news stories from various sources on foreign policy opinions. Jordan and Page find that the administration in Washington seems to have a bigger impact on foreign policy opinions than on domestic ones, and that news that appears on television substantially affects collective public opinion about international affairs. The authors also find that news commentary, news from experts and popular presidents all have a positive influence on international public opinion. Jordan and Page find that although Americans pay attention to their own experts and political leaders on the television, they discount the views of foreign leaders.

Jerit, Barabas, and Bolsen (2006) examined what impact different types of media had on the information gap between high and low educated people. The authors find that whenever people are exposed to high levels of information from the media in either print or television, everyone's knowledge increases, but the highly educated learn disproportionately more from newspaper coverage than the low educated do. Additionally, Jerit, Barabas, and Bolsen find that increases in television coverage benefit low educated people almost as much as high educated people. This study shows that the media influences the knowledge and information people have and demonstrates what kind of power a government can over people whenever it is has a direct hand in the media.

Leeson (2008) examines the impact media freedom from government control has on citizens' political knowledge, political participation, and voter turnout. He finds that low media

freedom is strongly associated with poor political knowledge, low political participation, and low voter turnout. Durante and Knight (2009) examine the impact of partisan control of the media on news content and viewership by consumers with differing ideologies using data from Italy. The authors choose Italy because of its two largest television networks: one is public and largely controlled by the ruling political party; and the other is privately owned by Silvio Berlusconi, the leader of the center-right party. Durante and Knight examine data from 2001 thru 2007, whenever the control of government switched from the center-left to the center-right, and find that news content on public television did indeed shift to the right. The authors also find that viewers responded to this change by watching channels with ideological content similar to their own.

Barabas and Jerit (2009) advanced the literature on the effects of media coverage on policy-specific knowledge by examining the impact of volume, breadth, and prominence of news media coverage. Volume refers to the sheer number of news stories covering a specific event, and the authors find that it does increase policy-specific knowledge, but not as much as breadth and prominence. The authors defined breadth as the number of distinct outlets covering a news story such as television and print. Prominence was measured by the number of times a story was placed on the front page of *USA Today* or appeared on CBS Evening News before the first commercial. This suggest that the public is heavily influenced by not only the amount of coverage a story gets, but where it is placed on different types of media. If the media makes a story important by putting it on the front page or showing it before a commercial, the public will also perceive it as something important.

Ladd and Lenz (2009) examined the impact that newspapers who switched from endorsing the Conservative Party to the Labour Party prior to the 1997 United Kingdom general

election had on its readers. They compared readers of newspapers that switched to endorsing the Labour Party to similar individuals who did not read the newspapers. They find that newspaper readers responded to this endorsement change by seeing that between 10 to 25% of the readers were persuaded and voted for the Labour Party instead of the Conservative Party.

Enikolopov, et al. (2009) examine whether or not the media affects voting behavior and what difference an independent media outlet can make in a country with state controlled media. The authors answer these questions by comparing electoral outcomes and votes during the 1999 parliamentary elections in Russia for the areas that only had access to the state controlled television channel compared to those that also had access to the independent channel. The authors find that the presence of the independent channel decreased the aggregate vote for the government party and increased the combined vote for major opposition parties. Enikolopov, et al. also find that individuals who watched the independent channel had an increased probability of voting for opposition parties, but that the independent channel was limited to only having a big effect on votes of people with low political knowledge.

C. Public Opinion and Its Impact on Foreign Policy

Graber (1968) studied four decisions during the early period of American history: Adam's decision to renew negotiations with France in 1800, the Louisiana Purchases, Madison's policies leading up to the War of 1812, and the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine. Graber found that public opinion was an important factor in decision making in each case, although it was not the most important single factor compared to personality, ideological, and other differences among the four presidents. Hilderbrand (1981), however, was unable to discover that public opinion had a significant impact on foreign policy making during the quarter century (1897-1921) encompassing the McKinley, Rosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations.

Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida (1989) also tested Almond's (1950) claim of an irrational public by examining if presidential candidates "waltzed before a blind audience" (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida, 1989, p.136). This study attempted to see if presidential candidates are wasting their time and effort by campaigning, on foreign and defense policies to voters, who according to Almond (1950) and others, possess little information and weak opinions on these issues. The authors find in their study of presidential campaigns between 1952 and 1984 that in five of the nine elections during this period, foreign issues had been commonly cited as among the most important problems facing the nation. Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida (1989) find that whenever presidential candidates campaign on foreign policy themes and discuss them thoroughly, the public responds by forming attitudes on foreign policy as well. They also find that the greater the differences between candidates, the more important foreign and defense issues will be in voter choice.

Page and Barabas (2000) examined foreign policy preferences of samples of citizens and leaders from seven Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) surveys between 1974 and 1988 and found that often times, a majority of the public has disagreed with a majority of leaders. The situations for these disagreements vary such as the public placing a higher priority than leaders on expanding domestic programs and foreign policies that aim to protect American jobs. The authors argue that these gaps between what the public and leaders care about have different meanings in different situations. Some of these gaps reflect that the public is less informed on certain foreign affairs and that the leaders are more aware of what needs to be done internationally. On the other hand, however, the authors state that in cases where the public is ill-informed, these gaps suggest a failure of leaders to educate and persuade the public properly. They find that in some cases, the public misunderstands how the world works but in other cases where public opinion is well-informed and a gap exists between what the public and leaders want, democratic theory calls for some kind of responsiveness by policymakers.

III. Methodology

A. Data

At this time, there is no other known study that has examined why there is a difference between domestic and foreign ratings of national leaders. Furthermore, previous research on international and political trust has focused on survey data and subjective measures for dependent variables. Because there is no previous theoretical model to build off of in determining what factors are associated with explaining the difference between the rating a foreign country gives a leader and the rating the domestic country gives, many variables were examined and tested to determine their merit in explaining the differences in national leader ratings.

In order to figure out what could best explain why foreigners rate leaders differently than domestic citizens do, many variables ranging from aggregate economic measures to cultural and political science measures were analyzed and most were found to be highly correlated with one another. These variables included a country's voter turnout, GDP per capita, net exports as a percentage of GDP, internet users per 100 people, percentage of total population living in urban areas, and whether a country was a member of NATO or the EU. Other variables that were examined but found to be insignificant were measures of civil liberties and political freedom, percentage of the population that was Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and atheist, average years of schooling, intensity of conflict between other countries, press freedom indices, and corruption scores. Other measures commonly used in political science such as freedom of speech, women's political rights, and physical integrity rights were also examined but found to be insignificant. Each of the 20 countries in the World Public Opinion survey were paired up with one another and the differences for the variables were calculated by subtracting the values for the domestic country from the values for the foreign country that was rating the domestic country's leader.

Once again, because there was no theoretical model to build off of in determining what factors are associated with explaining why this difference in ratings exist, many of the different types of variables previously mentioned were all analyzed to determine which ones, if any, had significant explanatory power. After conducting a pair-wise correlation analysis of over 40 variables, the list of the most significant determinants was narrowed down to a few determinants that are least correlated with one another but highly correlated with the dependent variable. The table below shows the variables that were found to be significant in explaining the differences in the ratings of world leaders.

Table 1: Variables Used

Dependent Variable	Description	Source
<i>LeaderRating_i - LeaderRating_j</i>	The rating leader receives from foreign country <i>i</i> minus the rating leader receives from domestic country <i>j</i>	World Public Opinion Survey
Independent Variables	Description	Source
<i>PowerDistanceIndex_i - PowerDistanceIndex_j</i>	Power Distant Index of foreign country <i>i</i> minus Power Distant Index of domestic country <i>j</i>	Hofstede (1980)
<i>LongTermOrientation_i - LongTermOrientation_j</i>	Long-Term Orientation of foreign country <i>i</i> minus Long-Term Orientation of domestic country <i>j</i>	Hofstede (1980)
<i>NetExports_i - NetExports_j</i>	Net exports as a percentage of GDP of foreign country <i>i</i> minus Net exports as a percentage of GDP of domestic country <i>j</i>	Calculated from CIA World Factbook
<i>EthnicDiversity_i - EthnicDiversity_j</i>	Ethnic diversity score of foreign country <i>i</i> minus Ethnic diversity score of domestic country <i>j</i>	Fearon (2003)
<i>PressFreedomIndex_i - PressFreedomIndex_j</i>	Press freedom index of foreign country <i>i</i> minus Press freedom index of domestic country <i>j</i>	Reporters without Borders

Hofstede (1980) analyzed a large selection of data collected by IBM between 1967 and 1973 on employee value scores from more than 70 countries. From this data, Hofstede studied the interactions between national and organizational cultures and developed five tools that are used in international business to assist in differentiating cultures. All five of Hofstede's tools

were analyzed in determining what variables had the most significant explanatory power, but only Power Distant Index and Long-Term Orientation were highly correlated with the difference in world leader ratings but least correlated with each other.

Power Distant Index measures the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. In countries with lower Power Distance Indices, people accept and expect power relations that are more democratic. In countries with high Power Distance Indices, people accept and expect power relations that are more autocratic and oppressive. A country with a high Power distant index will have more people who are more accepting of inequality and leaders that do not push principles of democracy.

The other tool that Hofstede (1980) developed that was found to be significant was Long-Term Orientation. This measure measures how much a country values the future compared to the present. According to Hofstede, countries with high Long-Term orientation value saving, determination, and actions that affect the future. These countries place great importance on the future and look at the big picture instead of only seeking short-term benefits.

The Ethnic diversity scores for each country were developed by Fearon (2003) and are measures of ethnic fractionalization, which is the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a given country will be from different ethnic groups. A country with an ethnic diversity score of 0.48 means that if two people were randomly selected from this country, there is a 48% chance that these two people will be from different ethnic groups. Power Distant Index, Long-Term Orientation, and Ethnic diversity scores were selected because they measure the differences between cultures and different ethnic groups.

Reporters without Borders rank countries every year on the amount of press freedom each country has and scores range from 0 to 100, with 100 meaning zero press freedom. In order to make the interpretation easier, I subtracted each of the original scores from 100 so that the higher a country's Press freedom index, the more press freedom that country has. Now a score of 0 would mean zero press freedom, instead of 100, which I found to be more intuitive than how they scores were originally set up.

B. Econometric Model

The proposed econometric model aims at predicting the difference between the ratings a national leader receives from foreign country compared to the rating he receives from his own by looking at variables that were found to have strong explanatory power. Therefore, we estimate the following model:

$$\begin{aligned}
 LeaderRating_i - LeaderRating_j = & \alpha + \beta_1(PowerDistanceIndex_i - PowerDistanceIndex_j) \\
 & + \beta_2(LongTermOrientation_i - LongTermOrientation_j) + \beta_3(NetExports_i - NetExports_j) \\
 & + \beta_4(EthnicDiversity_i - EthnicDiversity_j) + \beta_5(PressFreedomIndex_i - PressFreedomIndex_j) \\
 & + \mu
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

IV. Results and Analysis

Results of the least squares estimation with robust standard errors of Equation (1) can be found in Table 2 below. Standardized regression (Beta) coefficients were used because they allow one to directly compare the magnitude of the relationship across different units of measurements. Beta coefficients make it easier to compare the influence of different variables on the dependent variable and see which ones are stronger than others.

$$\begin{aligned}
 LeaderRating_i - LeaderRating_j = & \alpha + \beta_1(PowerDistanceIndex_i - PowerDistanceIndex_j) \\
 & + \beta_2(LongTermOrientation_i - LongTermOrientation_j) + \beta_3(NetExports_i - NetExports_j) \\
 & + \beta_4(EthnicDiversity_i - EthnicDiversity_j) + \beta_5(PressFreedomIndex_i - PressFreedomIndex_j) \\
 & + \mu
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

Table 2: Estimation Results

Coefficient	Beta Estimate	Robust Standard Error	P-Value
β_0	-0.247***	0.016	0.000
$\beta_1(\text{PowerDistanceIndex}_i - \text{PowerDistanceIndex}_j)$	-0.172***	0.000	0.000
$\beta_2(\text{LongTermOrientation}_i - \text{LongTermOrientation}_j)$	0.289***	0.000	0.000
$\beta_3(\text{NetExports}_i - \text{NetExports}_j)$	0.394***	0.001	0.000
$\beta_4(\text{EthnicDiversity}_i - \text{EthnicDiversity}_j)$	0.188***	0.046	0.001
$\beta_5(\text{PressFreedomIndex}_i - \text{PressFreedomIndex}_j)$	-0.461***	0.000	0.000
R-Squared	0.635	F-Statistic	63.36
Root MSE	0.170	P-Value (F-Statistic)	0.000
Observations	140		
Estimator	OLS with robust standard errors		

***Significant at 0.01, **Significant at 0.05, *Significant at 0.1

Table 2 shows that although the model appears to be very simple, it explains over half of the variations and passes the specifications tests.²

The estimate for β_1 indicates that as a foreign country's Power Distance Index increases, that country will rate a world leader lower compared to what the domestic country will. Specifically, if a country's Power Distant Index increases by 1 unit, that country will rate a world leader 0.172 points lower than the domestic country will. Countries that have a higher Power Distance Index are more accepting of inequality and are more likely to hold the belief that leaders should not force equality on people. Because of this, these countries with a higher Power Distance Index are harder on foreign leader who try to impose equality on people, and thus rate foreign leaders lower than the domestic country does.

The estimate for β_2 indicates that as a foreign country's Long-Term Orientation increases, they will rate a leader higher than the domestic citizens will. Specifically, a 1 unit increase in a country's Long-Term Orientation is associated with that country rating a world leader 0.289 points lower than the domestic country will. A country that values long-term goals more than short-term goals will have a higher Long-Term Orientation and will perhaps see that foreign leaders are making policies that are beneficial to that country's long-term success. The domestic country who does not value the long-term as much, however, may see their leader's policies as negative and not beneficial in the short-run. Therefore the foreign country valuing long-term success will rate a foreign leader higher than the domestic citizens who are less interested in the long will. Additionally, the estimate for β_2 also suggests that a foreign country who values the short run more will rate a leader lower than the domestic country will. This makes logical sense because a country that cares more about the long-term will be more accepting of policies that may sacrifice short-term for long-term success than a foreign country who does not value the long run as much.

The estimate for β_3 suggests that as a country's net exports as a percentage of GDP increases by \$1000, that country will rate a foreign leader higher than the domestic citizens will by 0.394 points. A country that is heavy on exports is very reliant on other countries and the policies that allow them to conduct trade. These countries are thus more likely to rate foreign leaders higher than domestic countries who do not exports as much will. Also, a country that has negative net exports will perhaps see their own leader as a "sell-out" who does not care about protecting domestic companies from competing companies overseas. These countries who import more than they export will then rate their leader lower than a foreign country will.

The estimate for β_4 suggests that a country with higher ethnic diversity will rate foreign leaders higher than the domestic country will. Specifically, a country that increases its ethnic diversity by 1 unit will rate a foreign leader 0.188 points higher than the domestic country will. It can be argued that countries with higher ethnic diversities are more accepting of people's differences than other countries that are more homogenous because more people are exposed to different types of people with different types of backgrounds. These countries perhaps would also be more accepting of a foreign leader's policies, such as those that promote racial and income equality, than the domestic citizens, which are more homogenous, would be. Additionally, a country who has less ethnic diversity will rate a foreign leader lower than the domestic country will.

The estimate for β_5 indicates that as a country's press freedom index rises, they will rate a foreign leader lower than the domestic country will. Specifically, as a country's press freedom index decreases by 1 unit, that country will rate a foreign leader 0.461 points lower than the domestic country will. The higher the press freedom index, the more press freedom a country has. Therefore a country with higher press freedom will be more likely to have more resources and information from an unbiased media and are able to more accurately judge their own and other foreign leaders. By the same token, a country with lower press freedom will be more likely to overrate a foreign leader because of ignorance because the government has more control of the press and what information is shared with the public. As a country's press freedom index increases, they will rate all world leaders lower, including their own.

V. Economic Implications

This contribution to the literature on public opinion about foreign leaders holds important implications. First, because foreign policies are designed to respond to, or anticipate the response of, foreign nations, it is a reasonable assumption that national images play an important role in shaping and driving foreign policy attitudes. Therefore, if a leader represents a country and the image it portrays, then that leader's image will play an important role in how foreigners view that country and the policies it makes towards that country. If foreigners view another country's leader as untrustworthy and threatening, they are also more likely to view that country in the same regard and thus design its foreign policies accordingly. These findings that high press freedom is associated with lower ratings of not only foreign but also domestic leaders is consistent with previous research which has shown that with more press freedom, comes more political knowledge. With more political knowledge, people have more information to make informed decisions and are ultimately harder on not only their own leaders but foreign leaders as well. Another implication of these findings is that countries that have low press freedom have most if not all of their information filtered by the government. Therefore, whenever a country creates foreign policies, that country must be aware of how a country with low press freedom will perceive it. Whenever the United States, a country with high press freedom, pursues a foreign policy against Iran, a country with low press freedom, the United States must be aware that Iran's government controls what the general public in Iran learn and can turn a well intended policy upside down and make it out to be aggressive and threatening.

VI. Suggestions for Future Research

The purpose of this study was to start to examine why people feel differently about leaders throughout the world. There has been much research on the different trends that have occurred regarding public opinion on foreign affairs but very limited research on the actual effect public opinion has on foreign policy making. More research is needed in this area to determine the actual consequences public

opinion has on foreign policy. Additionally, as new World Public Opinion survey data is made available, it would be interesting to see if the results in this study hold up and what impact, if any, new leaders such as President Obama have on the opinions of foreigners around the world.

VII. Conclusion

There has been much research done to determine whether or not public opinion on international affairs is rational and what shapes it. This paper contributes to research on international public opinion by examining why foreigners rate world leaders differently than domestic citizens do. World leaders are the face of the country and many people form judgments about a country based largely on who is in charge and what they stand for. I find that countries that rely more on exports will tend to rate foreign leaders higher than domestic citizens will. In addition, countries which have a higher ethnic diversity and are more focused on the long-term as opposed to the short term will also tend to rate foreign leaders higher than the domestic country will. I also find that countries which are more accepting of inequality will tend to rate foreign countries lower than domestic citizens will. As previous research shows, countries that have more political freedom have greater resources to more accurate and unbiased information and our results confirm this by showing that countries with higher political freedom are more critical on foreign leaders than domestic citizens with less political knowledge are.

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Appendix 1A: Multicollinearity Correlations Table

Table 3: Correlations Table

	<i>(PowerDistanceIndex_i - PowerDistanceIndex_j)</i>	<i>(LongTermOrientation_i - LongTermOrientation_i)</i>
<i>(PowerDistanceIndex_i - PowerDistanceIndex_j)</i>	1.000	0.219
<i>(LongTermOrientation_i - LongTermOrientation_i)</i>	0.219	1.00
<i>(NetExports_i - NetExports_j)</i>	0.366	0.017
<i>(EthnicDiversity_i - EthnicDiversity_j)</i>	0.105	-0.269
<i>(PressFreedomIndex_i - PressFreedomIndex_j)</i>	-0.308	-0.379
	<i>(NetExports_i - NetExports_j)</i>	<i>(EthnicDiversity_i - EthnicDiversity_j)</i>
<i>(NetExports_i - NetExports_j)</i>	1.00	0.060
<i>(EthnicDiversity_i - EthnicDiversity_j)</i>	0.060	1.000
<i>(PressFreedomIndex_i - PressFreedomIndex_j)</i>	-0.440	-0.009
	<i>(PressFreedomIndex_i - PressFreedomIndex_j)</i>	
<i>(PressFreedomIndex_i - PressFreedomIndex_j)</i>	1.00	

Appendix 1B: Variance Inflation Factor Table

Table 4: Variance Inflation Factor

Variable	Variance Inflation Factor	1 / Variable Inflation Factor
<i>(PowerDistanceIndex_i - PowerDistanceIndex_j)</i>	1.26	0.794
<i>(LongTermOrientation_i - LongTermOrientation_j)</i>	1.38	0.726
<i>(NetExports_i - NetExports_j)</i>	1.41	0.711
<i>(EthnicDiversity_i - EthnicDiversity_j)</i>	1.12	0.892
<i>(PressFreedomIndex_i - PressFreedomIndex_j)</i>	1.52	0.657
Mean Variance Inflation Factor	1.34	

Appendix 1C: Link Test Table

Table 5: Link Test (As Reported in Stata)

```
. linktest
```

Source	SS	df	MS	
Model	6.88307196	2	3.44153598	Number of obs = 140
Residual	3.71481016	137	.027115403	F(2, 137) = 126.92
Total	10.5978821	139	.076243756	Prob > F = 0.0000
				R-squared = 0.6495
				Adj R-squared = 0.6444
				Root MSE = .16467

difference~u	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_hat	.6626743	.1540503	4.30	0.000	.3580505	.9672981
_hatsq	-.5909771	.2458997	-2.40	0.018	-1.077227	-.1047275
_cons	-.0196733	.0237646	-0.83	0.409	-.0666661	.0273195

Appendix 1D: Omitted Variable Test

Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of (*PowerDistanceIndex_i* - *PowerDistanceIndex_j*)

Null Hypothesis: Model has no omitted variables

$$F(3, 131) = 4.27$$

$$\text{Probability} > F = 0.0065$$